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INTRODUCTION
This paper demonstrates that responses to the recent
California drought are consistent with the prediction of
economic theory. It also shows that a distinct event such as a
drought leads to major changes in institutions and technology.
The prevalence of traditional irrigation technologies, large
proportions of acreage allocated to water-intensive crops, and
rarity of water marketing in California might have contributed
to skepticism about the capacity of financial incentives and
scarcities to induce changes in water-use patterns and
institutions in the state. Evidence of the behavior of various
decisionmakers at farm, water district, and state project levels
during the drought are presented here to document the
responsiveness of California water users and institutions to
water scarcities. The paper interprets data from several
sources, including findings of two surveys, without formal
modeling. The results speak for themselves, are accessible to
noneconomists, and are unadulterated by the statistical
assumptions necessary for econometric estimations.

Drought is one of the biggest and devastating events that
mankind has witnessed throughout the world.
The
determination of the drought onset or end, as well as its
severity, is difficult. It is a gradual phenomenon, its impact
can, nevertheless, be devastating. The drought’s impacts are
dependent not only on the duration, intensity, and
geographical extent, but also on the demands by human
activities, flexibility of the region's water storage and supply,
and the institutions of the delivery system. They evolve over
time and are influenced by the interactions between supply
and demand. Drought events and adaptation throughout the
world have been documented in Yevjevich et al. (1983),
Wilhite et al. (1987), and Wilhite (1993).
A comparative study of drought policies (Wilhite, 1986)
suggests that governments often respond to drought through
crisis management rather than preplanned programs. A
National Research Council study argues that public agencies
respond to water shortage, mainly by adjusting water supply.
Easterling and Riebsame (1987) assess drought impacts and
adjustments in agriculture and water resource systems. They
emphasize dynamic adjustments to reduced water availability,
but have very little behavior analysis explicitly understanding
the role of incentives and economic consideration affecting
water use.

The results of this paper confirm the importance of water
reservoirs in stabilizing surface water supplies. Because of
these reservoirs, farmers were not affected noticeably during
the first three years of the 1987-1991 California droughts.
Only during the last two years of the drought water supply to
junior rights owners was reduced markedly, and the responses
were increased pumping of ground water, adoption of water
conservation technologies, and fallowing of land. The last year
of the drought also witnessed an important institutional
change, namely, introduction of water trading.

Documentation on droughts in California includes data on
water inventories and allocation, a summary of policies,
rationing of water by urban communities, and changes in state
water allocation to urban and agricultural users (DWR, 1977;
DWR, 1991). These reports also provide the impacts on
ground water quantity and quality and economic consequences
on agriculture and the urban areas. This paper is concerned
with the 1987-1991 drought in California and its impact on the
agricultural sector. California is an example of a state that
relies heavily on water harvesting projects because it is very
sensitive to rainfall and drought conditions. California is
basically a desert state that invented itself by water. A
drought that long and significant has not been observed and
documented before. More detailed presentations of the results
of the paper appear in Zilberman et al., 1998).

While the results of the paper confirm the importance of
economic incentives and forces in response to changes, it also
suggests a weakness in our economic education and analysis.
Differential calculus is used to derive many results in
economics. Textbooks such as Teitenberg mostly educate the
students to think in terms of continuous response of the
system to small changes. In many cases the system is rigid
and small changes in prices and other parameters may not
induce significantly observed changes in behavior. On the
other hand, massive changes such as the ones changed by the
drought resulted in substantial changes and behavior that are
consistent with the prediction of economic theory. That
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suggests that economists should develop analytical tools and
emphasize analysis that deals with extreme events.

of a drought, which lasts several years, deliveries of water
from a reservoir will decline as the drought progresses.

BACKGROUND

Figure 1 shows that water stocks declined during the first few
years of the California drought. Water stock declined by about
50 percent at the end of the second year of the drought to
around 15 million AF. Table 1 shows that, even though the
drought started in 1987, significant reductions in deliveries to
water districts occurred only in the fourth year of the drought,
1990, and even larger reductions occurred in 1991. The
reduction affected mostly contractors of the federal and state
water projects who have relatively junior water rights
compared to other surface water users.

California is the leading agricultural state in the United States,
but its larger agricultural counties are in arid zones.
Agriculture accounted for 80 percent of the water consumed in
California in normal years in the 1980s (27 MAF (million acre
foot) out of 34.5 MAF, CDWR, 1991). The physical system
of mining, storage, and transportation has not changed much
since the 1960s when the two major projects, the State Water
Project (SWP) and the Central Valley Project (CVP), were
added to existing surface water projects in the state. The
California water system has significant water storage capacity
that allows it to adjust to short-term shortages, but the
drought of 1987-1991 tested the system. In the years, 19871991, statewide runoff was 48 percent, 48 percent, 70 percent,
48 percent, and 43 percent of normal runoff, respectively; and
by summer, 1991, the CVP major reservoirs held less than 50
percent of their storage capacity of 25 MAF. This severe
drought led to the changes that will be reported below.

We will use a generic term, water district, to refer to the
different types of organizations that buy and sell water. It is
reasonable to assume that they do not pursue profits but
rather provide a service and aim to cover their costs. It is also
reasonable to assume that they have relatively high fixed costs.
Thus, as water districts receive less supply during a drought,
they may increase user fees and water prices. Water districts
may also replace some of the lost surface water supply by
pumping ground water and by reducing conveyance losses
through lining canals.

The analysis in this paper relies on results from a variety of
studies, but most of the results were drawn from two surveys
conducted in the summer of 1991. Questionnaires were
distributed to all California water districts and irrigation
equipment dealers. Responses at various degrees of details
were received from 135 water districts (70 percent of the
districts) covering 85 percent of the irrigated land in California
and 60 percent of the surface water used for irrigation. The
dealer survey yielded 29 responses out of 45 contacts. Both
surveys included responses to questions related to the period
1987-91. A more detailed description of the survey tools can
be found in Zilberman et al. (1992).

The results of the water district survey show that, indeed,
during the drought, about 50 percent of the responding
districts changed water pricing, with a higher percentage in
southern regions, where there was greater scarcity.
Additionally, 11 percent of the responding districts lined their
canals and 12 percent installed pressurized pipelines after
1987. Districts in the San Joaquin and Fresno counties in the
Central Valley faced particularly severe cutbacks in water
availability. As a result, the largest number of water districts
in these regions changed their water allocation rules, 69 percent
of the districts in San Joaquin and 57 percent in Fresno,
against the statewide average of 53 percent. The drought also
led the districts to offer assistance to growers for irrigation
scheduling (45 percent) and subsidized loan programs for
changing their irrigation methods (39 percent).

Decisionmakers in an agricultural water system include
managers of surface water reservoirs who decide about water
releases at various periods; water district managers who set the
prices and sell water to farmers; farmers, who use the water;
and finally, water agencies that establish water allocation rules.
We will analyze the response of each of these agents to the
five-year drought in the following sections.

FARMERS WATER CHOICES
Economic considerations suggest that, ceteris paribus,
reduction in water supply and increased water prices will lead
farmers to increase their reliance on ground water, adopt
water-conserving technology, reduce water use per acre, move
away from water-intensive crops, and fallow land (Dinar &
Zilberman, 1991). The intensity of these responses is likely
to increase as the drought progresses and water supplies
decline.

WATER SUPPLY DECISIONS
About two-thirds of the surface water used in California is
allocated according to the Prior Appropriation Doctrine. The
state and federal water projects account for one-third of the
surface water, and they have junior rights relative to other
surface water users. Water reservoirs managers control
allocation of large inventories of surface water, and their
choices should be consistent with inventory management
under uncertainty since precipitation varies from year to year.
Principles of inventory management suggest that annual water
releases should depend on the stock of water in the reservoir
rather than the actual annual precipitation. Thus, in the case

The observed behavior is consistent with the above
predictions. Figure 1 shows a continuous increase in the
number of wells throughout the drought and an inverse
correlation between water stocks in reservoirs and number of
wells drilled. Values in Table 1 demonstrate the increase in
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ground water pumped in the central and southern San Joaquin
regions, during the later years of the drought when surface
water deliveries declined. The water district surveys show
that both districts and farmers contributed to this increase.
The irrigation dealer survey shows a 25 percent annual
increase in the sale of pumps during the drought.

water and conservation were not sufficient to offset reduced
surface water supplies. Table 1 suggests that the drought led
to an increase of more than 50 percent in the volume of acres
fallowed in our sample.
Table 1 provides a quantitative assessment of the importance
of various components in adjusting to the shortfall of water
supplies in the last two years of the drought from the 19871989 levels. In 1991 the project contractors in our sample
received 1.638 MAF less than the average deliveries in 19871989. About 30 percent of this shortfall was covered by
increased ground water pumping (ground water pumping is
undocumented so our analysis probably underestimates the
amount of pumping). About five percent was covered by
increased supply of nonproject water. Assuming that each
acre foot of fallowed land released 3.5 AF of water, fallowing
accounted for about another 30 percent of the shortfall. Thus,
all other adjustment methods (new irrigation technologies, crop
switching, conservation) accounted for the remaining 36.3
percent of the adjustments in 1991. These simple calculations
suggest that when there were substantial reductions in project
water supply, conservation, fallowing, and increased ground
water pumping each accounted for 1/3 of the short-term
adjustments.

A historical perspective is useful for assessing the changes in
irrigation practices that occurred during the drought.
According to Casterline, Dinar, and Zilberman (1989) sprinkler
irrigation was introduced in California during the late 1940s
and low volume irrigation (LVI) systems, including drip and
micro sprinkler were introduced in 1970. The diffusion of
these technologies in the pre-drought period, 1982-1986, was
rather slow and in 1985 sprinkler irrigation was used on 25
percent of irrigated land in California. These technologies were
adopted mostly on locations with sandy soils, uneven
topography, relatively expensive water, and, in the case of
LVI, for tree crops.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, there was a significant increase in
the use of LVI during the drought. Between 1987 to 1991, LVI
replaced sprinkler irrigation for different categories of tree
fruits and increased its land share to .6 in citrus, .4 in fruits and
nuts, and .3 in grapes. LVI was also introduced in major
vegetable crops, such as tomatoes for processing, and lettuce.
Sprinkler irrigation significantly replaced furrow in other
vegetable crops and in cotton (the most important field crop in
California). Thus, the drought intensified the adoption of
irrigation technologies in crops that used them before and led
to their adoption on crops normally grown with traditional
irrigation methods.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Water has been allocated in California according to the prior
appropriation system, which is a queuing system that
discouraged trade and did not provide much incentive for
conservation. The literature of the political economy of
resources (Rausser & Zusman) indicates that beneficiaries
from the status quo will stall attempts to introduce welfareimproving institutions, but these changes will occur at crisis
situations when efficiency benefits from reform are more
significant and apparent. Thus, as the drought progresses,
political economic argumentation suggests growing pressure
for institutional changes, such as the introduction of water
trading and marginal cost pricing of water.

This response supports the results of models analyzing
investment decisions under uncertainty, where the benefits of
irreversible investments are subject to random shocks
(McDonald & Siegel, 1986) and firms have the option of
delaying investments. Firms will invest only when the net
benefits of investment exceed a positive critical value. This
study confirms our expectation that random events such as a
drought are likely to drive the net benefits of investments in
irrigation technologies above the critical level and lead firms to
undertake investments they would not have otherwise.

The establishment of the California Drought Water Bank is a
major institutional breakthrough, with the state approving and
administering water trading. In 1991, it purchased 825,000 AF
of water and sold 435,000 AF of water. The purchase price
was $125 per AF, and the selling price was $175 per AF at the
Delta. To supply this water, 166,000 acres of agricultural land
were fallowed. Howitt et al., (1992) show that the water bank
provided substantial overall economic welfare gain to the state
and Dixon et al. show that the third-party effects of the water
bank were modest. Another example of institutional change is
the Central Valley Improvement Act of 1992 (also known as
the Bradley-Miller Bill), which legislated the reallocation of
800,000 AF of water annually from the Central Valley Project
for environmental purposes. It also allows the Bureau of
Reclamation contracts to sell their water under certain
conditions.

In the Westland water district (which suffered the largest
water supply reductions) farmers who continued with furrow
irrigation in that district reduced their per acre water use by
more than ten percent without significant yield changes. The
drought encouraged farmers to seek the advice of irrigation
consultants or to use computer software for their irrigation
scheduling. There was a dramatic increase in the use of the
services of the California Irrigation Management Information
System (CIMIS). From 1986 to 1991 the number of its users
increased from 500 to 2000 (CDWR, 1993).
By 1991 surface water inventories were not sufficient to
protect the farmers from the reduced precipitation, and ground
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Seven water districts introduced tiered pricing to provide
farmers with incentives to conserve water. Tiered water
pricing is essentially inverse block pricing in which an initial
volume of water, based on some historical level of use, is sold
at a given price; and water purchased above and beyond the
historical level is sold at a significantly higher price. Other
districts introduced buy-back programs.
Under these
programs, farmers are paid a certain amount not to consume all
of their entitled water.

commodity prices in the early 1970s, where prices reached a
new high. Many of the most important institutional changes
affecting U. S. agriculture have been the results of extreme
events, such as the depression and the dust bowls of the
1930s. We should emphasize the development of modeling
frameworks that are more capable of predicting the timing of
major changes, and more attention should be given to study the
impact of extreme events on institutional and technological
changes.

These examples illustrate that the drought led decisionmakers
at all levels to introduce mechanisms that rely on market forces
and financial incentives to enhance conservation of water.
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Figure 1: Water in Reservoirs and Wells Drilled during the 1987-1992 Drought
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Figure 2: Use of Drip Irrigation on Selected Crops, 1987-1991
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Table 1: Water Sources and Fallowed Acreage 1987-1991
Nonproject water
Project water

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

(thousands of acre feet)
Northern San Joaquin
1,112
2,086
1,087
1,653
1,128
2,048
962
1,903
846
1,613

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Ground
water Acreage fallowed
pumped
(thousands of acres)
199
*324
140
164
198

117
117
102
104
157

Central and Southern San Joaquin
1,818
411
1,787
198
1,954
335
1,372
203
511
436

189
186
196
388
677

109
119
148
129
211

All Other Regions
258
289
300
307
249

5,482
5,879
6,047
6,126
6,071

36
22
27
39
48

34
28
26
25
30

7,980
7,730
8,430
8,248
8,120

425
532
363
592
923

259
264
276
258
397

TOTAL
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

3,188
3,163
3,382
2,641
1,606

Table 2: Adjustments to Supply Reductions by Project Contractors, 1990-91

Project
water

Nonproject
water

(thousands of acre feet)

Groundwater
pumped

Acres
fallowed
@3.5 AF
per acre
(thousands of acres)

Water
Effect of
saving by conserfallowing vation
methods

Averages 1987-89

3244

8046

440

266

1990 shortfalls

603

(202)

(152)

(8)

(28)

(221)

1991 shortfalls

1638

(73)

(483)

(131)

(458.5)

(492.5)

*One water district drastically increased amount of ground water pumped this year because appropriative source was
reduced.
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